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Theater Ballistic Missile launching systems are vulnerable just after a
missile is launched because the missile's track can be extrapolated
backwards to the location of the launcher. The situation is similar to
one where a submarine torpedoes a ship, thus creating a "flaming
datum" near which ASW forces may concentrate a search for the
submarine. This report describes how some simple analytic methods
adapted from ASW can be applied to the task of locating the TBM
launcher.
1. THE TBM PROBLEM
SCUD launches during Desert Storm were a significant nuisance to the Allies,
and could have been worse had the missiles been armed with other than
conventional warheads. SCUD missiles are launched from Transporter Erector
Launcher vehicles (TELs), the kind of system that can be expected with any Theater
Ballistic Missile (TBM). TELs normally attempt to avoid detection, since they are
subject to air attack if caught in the open. Launching the missile requires the TEL to
be in the open, so the Allies spent considerable time and effort in "SCUD hunting" -
attempting to find and destroy the TELs. This effort was not notably successful,
(Cohen, 1993) so in the aftermath there has been some effort to explain why and
perhaps fix whatever the problem was, since similar situations involving TBMs
could occur in the future. This report is devoted to a simple model of one method of
dealing with TBMs, the "flaming datum" attack that may succeed in destroying the
TEL right after the launch of a missile.
One would prefer, of course, to find the TEL before the missile is launched,
rather than after. If the TELs have sufficient area to roam in, however, or if they are
difficult to distinguish from innocent traffic, it may not be possible to search the
available area rapidly enough to have an appreciable effect. There is an
AntiSubmarineWarfare (ASW) precedent for this situation. Submarines are
difficult to detect without some kind of initial cue as to location, so one strategy for
protecting ships from torpedo attacks is to wait until an attack occurs, which
establishes a "flaming datum" near which there must be a submarine, and then
react quickly to detect and attack the submarine. In doing so one is protecting all the
ships that the submarine would have attacked in the future, if not the current
victim. Such tactics are effective against submarines because each submarine would
attack many ships if left alone; sinking a submarine right after a torpedo attack is
almost as good as sinking it beforehand, statistically speaking. These tactics are also
potentially effective against TELs, since a TBM launch is easily detected and
extrapolated back to where the TEL must have been when it occurred. The only
problem is to get to the launch site quickly and effectively. The chances of doing this
are the subject of sections 2 and 3 of this report.
Nothing has been said above about the possibility that TELs may have shelters of
some kind thai protect them either from observation or attack. Such shelters could
do much to tilt the game in favor of the TEL force. In the worst case the shelters
would protect the TELs from air attack, and TBMs could be launched from the
shelter or so near it as to require very little time in the open. In that case very little
can be done from the air. In intermediate cases shelters might themselves be subject
to air attack, or might merely protect TELs from observation, or significant travel
away from the shelter might be required to launch a TBM. Analysis is possible in
these intermediate cases, but it should be emphasized that there are no shelters or
protective emplacements of any kind in the model described below, where the TEL's
only hope after launch of a TBM is to become lost in an area so large that further
search for it is pointless. If the environment is such that a TEL, after launching a
missile, says to himself, "Now I have to get away from here in a hurry before
searchers arrive", then the methods described below are applicable. If the TEL
instead says, "Now I have to hurry back to the shelter", then they are not applicable.
2. FLAMING DATUM ATTACKS
Assume that a launch takes place at time 0, and that the launching vehicle
(hereafter the "target") immediately proceeds away from the launch site with speed
17. The target necessarily remains inside a circle with radius Ut at time t after the
launch, the Farthest-On-Circle or FOC. At time i\, a searcher arrives and begins
searching in the FOC at speed V$ and with sweep width W. The sweep width W is
assumed to hold everywhere in the region, so there is no specific place for the target
to hide. The target may nonetheless escape detection because the area of the FOC
expands quadratically with time whereas the area covered by the searcher expands
only linearly. A probabilistic model of detection can be based on this observation. In
this model detections are assumed to happen in a nonhomogeneous Poisson
Process where the rate of detection A(f) is the ratio of the rate of covering area (V5W)
to the area of the FOC at time t:
Xit)=VsW/(xlPtl). (1)
If the searcher searches between t\ and t2, the average number of detections n{t\, t2)
is the integral of X(t) between those limits:
n(tlf t2)=Vs W/(7tlfi) a/h-l/t2). (2)
Since the actual number of detections is a Poisson random variable, the probability
of at least one detection is l-exp(-n(f|, t2)), me desired detection probability. Limited
testing of this model in an abstract situation where military officers played the roles
of target and searcher in 295 replications is in agreement with it. Figure 1 is taken
from Washburn (1989).
Formula (2) is much more sensitive to t\ than to t2 - Assume for simplicity that t2
is so large compared to t\ that it can safely be assumed to be infinite (note that
n(t}, t2 ) does not approach infinity with t2 ~ even searching "forever" will not
necessarily detect the target). In that case the detection probability is
PD(f 1)=l-exp(-VsW/(^LJ2f 1 )). (3)
Formula (3) will be assumed to govern detections in the next section.
3. AVERAGING THE DETECTION PROBABILITY
Formula (3) applies only when the time late t\ is given. In practice the time late
will vary depending on how near the nearest searcher is to the launch (only the
nearest searcher is assumed to respond even if several happen to detect or are
informed of the launch). We will use the upper case letter 7 to refer to time late in
this section to emphasize the fact that it is random (but some nonrandom quantities
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Figure 1
Let d be the average density of searchers per unit area. Typically d would be
calculated by some formula like
d=Nf/A (4)
where N is the number of searchers assigned to patrol the region in which targets
can be expected, A is the area of that region, and / is the fraction of the time during
which patrolling actually occurs. If a given searcher can patrol for 8 hours out of
every 24 and if launches can happen anytime, then / is 1/3. If launches happen
entirely at night (12 hours out of 24), then / would be 2/3 because the searchers
would patrol only at night. If launches could happen anytime, but if the sweep
width W were different between day and night, then determination of / would
require solution of a two-person-zero-sum game.
A rough analysis can be made by assuming that d is the density of a two-
dimensional Poisson field of searchers whenever the launch occurs, and that
launches are so widely separated in time as to be considered independent events.
Probably the latter assumption is worse than the former, since TELs are in reality
motivated to make multiple simultaneous launches that will exhaust the patrolling
searchers (as well as any defense that might be mounted against the missiles). In any
case, the Poisson assumption determines the distribution of S, the distance from the
launch to the nearest patroller. The event (S>s) is the event that the number of
patrollers in a circle of radius s about the launch is 0. Since the average number of
patrollers in that circle is nds 2 , Prob(S>s)=exp(-7rds 2 ). Since T is related to S by
T=S/Vj, where Vj is the transit speed of the closest searcher, the density function of
T can be determined by differentiation of the cumulative distribution function to be
fT(t)=27rtdV12exp(-7tdt2V12). (5)
T turns out to be a Rayleigh random variable. The average detection probability in a
flaming datum attack is then
oo
E{PD(T)) = \h-exp(-Vsw/(KUh))\(t)dt. (6)
By letting
x = VsVTWjdfi/u 2 , (7)
and substituting u-iudi VT in (6), equation (6) can be expressed in dimensionless
form as
oo
E(PD{T)) = 1 - Jexp(-(u + x/Vm))*w. (8)
6
Let (8) be called simply P(x), the detection probability as a function of x. Figure 2
shows the function P(x), calculated numerically, using MATLAB (1990).




If the TBM launch is detected by some system other than the responding aircraft,
then some allowance must be made for a communications delay c. The average
response time without the delay is E(T)=l/(2VxVd). Define an "equivalent transit
speed" Vf* to be such that 1/(2 VfVd)=c+ l/(2VTVd), so that
Vf=VT/(l+2cVTVd). (9)
Then replacing Vj by Vf in calculating x makes a rough correction for the
communications delay. A more accurate analysis would acknowledge that the total
response time including the communications delay is no longer a Rayleigh random
variable when c is included.
In summary, although there are a wide variety of input parameters that
influence the detection probability, it is only the dimensionless coverage parameter
x in (7) that is ultimately of any importance. Given x, the detection probability is a
simple graphical lookup. Conner, et al. (1993) give a more general model of TEL
detection that would accept this probability as an input.
4. AN EXAMPLE INVOLVING SCUD DETECTION
Except for W, which depends on the sensors involved and has therefore been
chosen arbitrarily, the following assumptions are roughly characteristic of detection
of SCUD launches within a country the size of Iraq by a fleet of 4 aircraft:
N = 4 aircraft
/ = .1 = fraction of the time actually on patrol
A - 100,000 square miles
Vs = 100 mph
VT = 300 mph
W = 10 miles
U = 20 mph
These parameters result in a coverage parameter x=.846, from which one would
conclude that 1-P(.846)=.65, so 65% of the launches should result in ultimate
detection by a pursuing aircraft.
If there were a communications delay c=15 minutes=.25 hour, then the
equivalent transit speed Vf according to (9) would be 231 mph. This would reduce x
to .651, and 1-P(.651)=.58. Without the communications delay the average response
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